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Abstract: We examine how trustworthy behaviour can be achieved in the financial 
sector. The task is to ensure that firms are motivated to pursue the long-term interests 
of customers rather than pursuing short-term profits. Firms’ self-interested pursuit of 
reputation, combined with regulation, is often not sufficient to ensure that this 
 happens. We argue that trustworthy behaviour requires that at least some actors show 
a concern for the well-being of clients, or a respect for imposed standards, and that the 
behaviour of these actors is copied in such a way that it becomes a behavioural norm. 
We briefly suggest what such behavioural norms might need to be if  trustworthy 
behaviour is to be achieved, and consider how they might be supported; we describe 
the research that is necessary in order to understand these norms in more detail. We 
argue that the norms of traders are different from the norms of those engaged in other 
activities, since they are inevitably self-interested, and we consider the risk that  traders’ 
norms might undermine those of other actors. We analyse the task for governance in 
dealing with this problem, and the role which leadership by a corporate board and 
management might play in doing this. We describe the need for further research to 
describe how this might be done. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, finance, norms, other-regarding behaviour, 
non- selfish motivation, trust, trustworthiness, short-termism.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The global financial crisis revealed how untrustworthy the financial sector is, and 
 subsequent studies indicate there has been little meaningful reform since. This paper 
considers how trustworthiness may be restored through the framing of non-self- 
regarding behavioural norms which improve the culture of the financial system.
The task is to ensure that firms are motivated to pursue the long-term interests of 
customers rather than pursuing short-term profits. Trustworthiness requires reliable 
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competence and honesty—a commitment to tell the truth and keep promises. 
Trustworthy behaviour must be understood and supported in such a way that it 
becomes a norm—a self-reinforcing pattern within a group.
The authors consider four types of financial activity: mortgage lenders and their 
advisors, fund managers, insurers, and traders, examining the different motivations, 
standards, and norms of each, and assessing how trustworthiness through non-self- 
interested behaviour may be advanced. 
For the first three groups, they suggest two necessary steps. First, that enough 
people realise the importance of acting in a way which has regard to the needs of 
 customers. Second, that others need to copy the behaviour to ensure it becomes a 
norm. 
The norms of traders, the fourth group, are different, since traders are inevitably 
self-interested. Unlike the other front-line employees analysed, norms that show con-
cern for others are inappropriate. Indeed, there is a risk that traders’ norms might 
undermine those of other actors. Traders have a narrowly defined set of obligations. 
They are expected to comply with these and avoid fraud.
Such differing norms, often within a single company, pose complex and testing 
governance questions for both boards and management. Financial institutions 
 invariably have multiple corporate purposes that may include competing and even 
conflicting services to different types of client and shareholder. Each require different 
norms for trustworthy behaviour and these need to be sustained by unique  motivations, 
or standards. 
The boards of trustworthy companies will work to ensure the longer term  prosperity 
of the firm. With their unique oversight of corporate strategy and operations, they 
will need to show strong leadership, finding ways of defending themselves against the 
pressure exerted by transactional shareholders, so as to encourage the behaviour of 
trustworthy employees. 
The paper describes specific areas of research which are required to understand 
how trustworthy behaviour can be made to happen, including how self-interested 
motivations can be prevented from infecting motivations in other parts of the institu-
tion, and how to protect customers in client-facing units from trading activity within 
the same firm that might damage their well-being.
The authors conclude by noting that efforts to achieve trustworthiness have 
 implications for the proposed ring fencing of banks into retail and investment entities. 
Trading departments in which employees are necessarily profit-seeking and self- 
interested should also be separated. The more complex and ambiguous the structure 
of a firm, the harder but more important such reform and restructuring will be to 
achieve, posing a clear challenge to those working on ethics management in finance, 
and ethical leadership.
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INTRODUCTION: TRUSTWORTHINESS IN FINANCE
The global financial crisis revealed how untrustworthy the financial sector is. Trust in 
financial leaders is low (Edelman 2018), with more people distrusting than trusting 
these leaders: net trust in financial leaders (the percentage who say that they trust 
leaders minus the percentage who say that they do not trust them) is −21 (Ipsos 
MORI 2017). Despite firms and governments taking steps to reform the industry 
(e.g., Barclays Bank 2013, House of Lords, House of Commons 2013, G30 2015), it is 
 generally thought that further reform is necessary. This paper is about how trust-
worthiness might be restored, and about the research which is needed to underpin a 
move in that direction.
In our view, two things are necessary. First, we think that trustworthiness will only 
return when the behaviour of those who work in the financial sector is underpinned 
by what we call non-self-regarding motivations. This includes motivations which are 
concerned with the well-being of clients and customers and motivations to do the 
right thing or follow correct procedures (Gold 2014). It appears that, in the period 
running up to the financial crisis, many of those working in the financial system 
became entirely self-regarding and selfish; showing a concern for the personal rewards 
which could be made rather than a concern for the outcomes for clients and custom-
ers. The papers brought together in Morris and Vines (2014) suggested that we need 
to find a way to reverse this. Second, it is rightly argued that not all of those who work 
in the financial system have, or can have, non-self-regarding motivations, and that 
outcomes will also depend on the behaviour of these other people. This paper goes 
beyond the papers presented in Morris and Vines (2014) by discussing the way in 
which the behaviour of non-self-regarding actors can be copied by others, so that 
norms of behaviour emerge which have regard for the well-being of customers and 
clients. These two points, taken together, can lead to an understanding of how to 
reform the culture of the financial system. 
There is, at present, rather little evidence on how motivations are formed, or on 
how the copying of the behaviour of those who lead by those who follow actually 
takes place, and on how leadership might influence these norms. In this paper we 
 discuss the work which is needed to provide that evidence. 
We also argue that the norms of traders are different from the norms of those 
engaged in other activities, in that traders are inevitably self-interested, and we con-
sider the risk that traders’ norms might undermine those of other actors. We analyse 
the task for governance in dealing with this problem, and the role which leadership by 
a corporate board, and management, might play in doing this. We describe the need 
for further research to describe how this might be done. 
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SELF-INTEREST, OTHER-REGARDING OBLIGATIONS,  
FRAMING, AND NORMS
Trust needs to be distinguished from trustworthiness. Many people put their trust in 
Bernie Madoff, but he was not trustworthy. Trustworthiness requires one to be com-
petent and honest, and reliably so (O’Neill 2002). Some researchers have argued that 
the global financial crisis was mainly the result of incompetence (de Bruin 2015) and 
it is clear that institutional and individual incompetence was pervasive. But there are 
also problems of honesty. The solution to those problems requires that actors be 
 prepared to reveal information, to tell the truth, and to keep promises, and that they 
be prepared to do so reliably. It is these issues which we address here. 
The standard way of analysing trustworthiness in financial markets builds on 
 traditional economists’ assumptions that firms set out to maximise profits and that 
employees are self-regarding and selfish: that is, motivated by the financial reward that 
they receive rather than by a conception of service to the public good. If  this is so, 
then a temptation will inevitably arise—as it did in extreme in the case of Madoff—to 
pursue returns at the expense of clients. The conventional argument is that, neverthe-
less, trustworthiness is likely to be achieved because firms, employees, and customers 
have long-term relationships (they are involved in ‘repeated games’) and that actors 
have an incentive to acquire a reputation for trustworthy behaviour (Mailath & 
Samuelson 2006). However, as is argued in Gold (2014) and Jaffer et al. (2014), the 
pursuit of reputation by self-interested actors is not sufficient to solve these problems. 
There are three reasons that firms, and the individuals within them, might not act in 
the interests of clients even when a reputation is being pursued: ‘incompleteness’ of 
contracts, that is, the fact that it is not possible to contract for every contingency 
(Williamson 1993); the impossibility of designing incentives that reliably promote 
desirable behaviour when information can be concealed (Noe & Young 2014); and the 
‘backwards induction problem’, which can lead trustworthy behaviour based on repu-
tation to unravel if  actors know that there will be an incentive to be untrustworthy 
some time in the future (Hollis 1998).
Trustworthiness particularly matters in finance. Since savings and investment are 
both long-term activities, in which savers and investors have far less information than 
the firms with which they deal, there is a particular need for financial firms to be seen 
to be trustworthy. In this paper we will focus on one particular possible lack of trust-
worthiness in the process of financial intermediation: namely, the pursuit of short-term 
returns by those who work for financial institutions, and the institutions themselves, 
at the expense of those to whom they provide financial services. As recent experience 
has shown, such pursuit can lead financial employees to exploit incomplete contracts 
and information asymmetries or to act badly now because they believe that such 
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behaviour will become common in the future. Examples, which we will discuss, include: 
(i) seeking short-term return from lending to overly risky borrowers, (ii) imposing 
harm on customers as a result of privileged information about difficulties likely to 
emerge in the future, and (iii) encouraging clients to pay now for insurance protection 
which is unlikely to benefit them in the future. There are other possibilities; for an 
extended discussion, see Jaffer et al. (2014) and Noe and Young (2014). Our paper will 
focus on ways of ensuring that financial firms are trustworthy, in that they do not do 
these things.
There is a large literature in psychology, and now in behavioural economics, which 
shows that human motivations are more varied than is assumed by economists, some-
thing which has now been taken up by behavioural economics. And philosophers 
 generally agree that trustworthy behaviour cannot simply involve the pursuit of 
 reputation by those seeking profit or financial incentives, but must involve some 
non-self-regarding motivations (Baier 1986, Holton 1994). 
Gold (2014) introduced the term ‘strong trust’ to identify trust based on non-self- 
regarding motivations, and to differentiate this from the ‘weak trust’ based on  reputation 
and financial incentives, which is found in the models of economists. Strong trust-
worthiness, she argued, is more robust than weak trustworthiness, in the face of the 
difficulties described above. Actors who are not entirely self-interested are less likely to 
exploit incomplete contracts, or to conceal information, or to act in an untrustworthy 
way because of the possibility that trust might break down in the future. 
Papers in Morris and Vines (2014) took their lead from this argument, using the 
idea of ‘framing’. That book suggested that many of the difficulties which have 
emerged in the financial sector could be avoided if  those working in the financial sec-
tor came to frame their activities as ones in which what mattered to them was the 
value of what they provided to their clients, rather than their own financial return. 
There were careful discussions of what would be achieved if  this were to happen. But 
it was rightly argued, in response to that book, that not all of those who work in the 
financial system have such motivations. This paper suggests that good behaviour by 
those with such motivations will be copied by others. As a result, such behaviour can 
become embedded in norms of behaviour which have regard for the well-being of 
customers and clients. 
THE RELEVANCE OF NORMS
Norms are patterns of behaviour that can be self-enforcing within a group: everyone 
conforms, everyone is expected to conform, and everyone wants to conform when 
they expect everyone else to conform. Norms are familiar: for instance about the way 
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that we tip, or do not tip, in restaurants. What each individual chooses to do depends, 
not just on his or her motivations, but in part on what is done by others. 
We use the word ‘norm’ in a particular manner, one which follows Young (2015) 
and Binmore (2006) and understands a social norm to be a pattern or regularity in 
behaviour that is self-enforcing within a group. This is the conception of norm which 
is normally used by social scientists when, for example, discussing standards and 
whether they are met or not. This usage is consistent with the usage in evolutionary 
models (e.g., Young 2015). Norms can be good or bad. In such an evolutionary pic-
ture, one reason for setting a standard is to change the norm from a bad equilibrium 
to a good equilibrium. The way in which we use the word norm does not address the 
idea of obligation—the idea that a social norm is a standard of behaviour or conduct 
shared by a social group and taken to be authoritative or obligatory for them by the 
majority of the members of the group (Anderson 2000). Norms of the kind that we 
describe can be sustained in many different ways, including the desire to coordinate, 
fear of being sanctioned, signalling membership in a group, or simply following the 
lead of others (Young 2015). In the present paper we focus entirely on the last of these 
mechanisms, although other mechanisms may well be at work in the situations which 
we describe. In other words, the effect of conforming may be to make trustworthy 
behaviour the norm, even although many individuals might, if  they were not partly 
following the behaviour of others, act in an untrustworthy manner. The fact that we 
suppose decisions by individuals to be partly influenced by the behaviour of others is 
what takes our approach to trustworthy behaviour beyond the analysis of other- 
regarding motivations that we described above. 
It is widely understood that, when each individual is also influenced in his or her 
choice by what is chosen by others, then more than one norm may emerge. In other 
words, there may be more than one stable situation, or ‘equilibrium’ (Young 2015). 
The possibility of such self-supporting outcomes depends on the fact that, when any 
one individual acts, he or she influences the behaviour of other people. When a small 
proportion of people choose to act in a trustworthy manner, the effect of these choices 
dissipates, leading to a change in the behaviour of few, if  any, others. But the more 
people who choose to be trustworthy, the larger the number of others who are induced 
to follow. This happens in a more than proportional manner: the behaviour of those 
who follow is influenced not only by those who choose to be trustworthy but also by 
the behaviour of others who are being induced to follow.1 In technical terms, there is 
a ‘non-linearity’. Beyond a certain point, the behaviour of the group can ‘tip’ into an 
outcome in which trustworthy behaviour becomes the norm (Susskind 2014).
1 This mechanism is explained in Young (2015).
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As applied to our case, individuals within a financial firm, or the firm as a whole, 
who would, on their own, choose to act in an untrustworthy manner, might, as a result 
of paying attention to the behaviour of others, decide to act in a trustworthy manner. 
This is particularly likely to be the case if  that actor is located within a firm in which 
others are acting in a trustworthy manner. It should be the aim of policy to support 
this outcome, rather than the opposite one in which untrustworthy behaviour becomes 
the self-supporting norm.
NORMS AND FINANCIAL REFORM
A policy of financial reform which aims to give rise to an outcome with a self- 
supporting trustworthy norm can be made to work in a number of different ways. 
A policy of financial reform can be designed so as to lead some actors in the 
 financial sector to change their motivations, by changing the way in which these actors 
frame what they do. As already set out in the papers in Morris and Vines (2014), indi-
viduals can come to see their activities as ones in which what matters to them is not 
just their own financial returns, but also the value of what they provide to their clients. 
As a result, these actors, and the firms within which they are located, can change their 
behaviour to become more trustworthy. But—and this is the point of focusing on 
norms—that will have effects on other actors in the financial sector as well, even if  
those other actors do not change the way they frame the activity. If  left to themselves, 
the motivations of these other actors lead them to act in an untrustworthy way. 
Nevertheless, it can be the case that, because of the behaviour of other-regarding 
actors, trustworthy behaviour becomes the norm.
The behaviour of such conformist actors is not driven by the interests of clients. 
But it can be sustainable because it tracks the behaviour of the other-regarding actors. 
That is to say, a change in framing by some may, of itself, shift the norm—if it changes 
the behaviour of enough others. To what extent this might happen is an empirical 
matter. We see an investigation of this question as an important topic for future 
research. 
Alternatively, a similar effect could be achieved with a policy of financial reform 
that is designed to work by setting out standards of trustworthy behaviour. In add-
ition, it might be possible to directly intervene to bring about changes in the work 
practices of at least some people, in a manner that is informed by psychology and 
behavioural economics, in order to cause these people to act in a more trustworthy 
manner. In both of these cases, as with that of changing motivations, inducing some 
actors to behave in a more trustworthy way can have effects on other actors, even if  
they themselves do not respond to the standard or to the behavioural interventions; 
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it may be that trustworthy behaviour becomes the norm. Those whose behaviour is 
 conformist are not guided by the standard or directly affected by the behavioural 
intervention. But acting in accord with the standard or the intervention may be sus-
tainable because it tracks the behaviour of the first set of actors. That is to say, the 
setting of the standard or the implementation of the behavioural intervention may, of 
itself, shift the norm—if it changes the behaviour of enough actors. To what extent 
this might happen is also an empirical matter. An investigation of this question is also 
an important further topic for future research.
Before we can use policy to bring about change in norms, we need to investigate 
what behaviours are needed in order for financial institutions to be trustworthy. A 
financial institution has multiple corporate purposes that include offering a wide 
range of financial services to many types of client or customer (O’Neill 2016). We will 
argue that the different activities require different norms for trustworthy behaviour 
and that these need to be sustained by motivations, or by standards, in different kinds 
of ways. At the end of the next section we will describe the kind of research which is 
needed to better understand what these norms might be. 
FUNCTIONS AND NORMS WITHIN A FINANCIAL FIRM: 
THE RESEARCH THAT IS NEEDED
In this section we discuss the failures which have emerged in financial firms from 
 following the traditional approach of using financial incentives to ensure that 
behavioural outcomes are trustworthy for customers. We describe the kind of research 
which will be required in order to understand what norms need to be established in 
order that this might change. 
Mortgage lenders and advisors
In the period before the global financial crisis, those who worked as mortgage lenders 
were remunerated according to the number of mortgages sold. This enabled those 
who provided mortgages to frame their circumstances as being ones in which only 
their own interests were of concern. That led to norms of behaviour that fell short of 
professional standards regarding how customers ought to be treated. 
The chain of events in the US was the following. House prices were rising which 
enabled lenders to provide more mortgages for sub-prime borrowers with poor credit 
histories—even although many of these people could not afford even the low rates of 
interest ruling at the time (Shiller 2013). The mortgages initially had low ‘teaser’ rates 
of interest, and were therefore initially affordable for poorer borrowers. But a 
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 requirement for a much higher interest rate after an initial period was built in;  averaged 
over the life of the mortgage, the returns would then be high. It was expected that 
poorer borrowers would nevertheless be able to pay the higher interest charges in the 
future, by increasing the size of the mortgage at that later time—when houses would 
be more valuable—by accessing this higher capital value to pay the higher interest 
obligations. Regulators could have prevented this high-risk financial engineering but 
they did not.2 Banks were able to increase the yield from this activity by funding 
increases in their lending, not by increasing capital but by leveraging, thereby increas-
ing the return on a bank’s capital by exploiting small gaps between the returns on 
lending and the cost of borrowing.3 Banks were then able to securitise mortgage loans 
and to sell the securities on to unregulated financial institutions which were not 
required to hold capital in support of this lending. In the end, since mortgage origin-
ators did not intend to hold onto the mortgages themselves and bear the risk of doing 
so, they did not need to carefully evaluate the riskiness of the mortgages which they 
created, and they did not do so. 
This was an untrustworthy outcome; employees pursued their own returns but 
showed an inadequate concern as to whether the mortgages served clients’ needs. 
When interest rates rose, there was large and widespread exposure to mortgages that 
failed, producing bad outcomes for borrowers. Financial instability was created; it 
became impossible to roll over the leveraged funding; this was the trigger which led to 
the global financial crisis.4
Detailed circumstances were different in the UK; nevertheless, ‘it was also clear 
that the existing regulatory framework had been ineffective in constraining particu-
larly risky lending and unaffordable borrowing’ (FSA 2010: 5). Evidence in the 
 ongoing Royal Commission into Banking in Australia has revealed continuing prob-
lems of this kind in that country (Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry 2018).
In the UK, action has been taken to address these problems. The UK regulator the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), has established a set of standards for ‘respon-
sible lending’ rules following a Mortgage Market Review. These rules: prevent the 
self-certification of mortgages; require a credible strategy for interest-only mortgages; 
insist that lenders stress-test affordability; and require that those obtaining a  mortgage 
2 The federal government guaranteed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two private-sector companies which 
for many years insured a large proportion of all mortgages in the US for very low premiums, and so 
subsidised an activity which was risky for lenders and dangerous for borrowers.
3 This way of increasing return of course increased the vulnerability of banks to the credit risk described 
in the preceding paragraph.
4 Macroprudential policy has been introduced to address the problem of system-wide financial stability; 
we do not discuss that major issue here. 
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are advised by qualified staff. And there is also now a separation between sales and 
advice.
Given the introduction of these new standards, will they establish new norms of 
responsible behaviour towards customers? The answer to this question is not yet clear, 
since this new regime is discretionary, and has not yet been tested. The FCA has 
required that lenders carry out stress tests using market expectations and taking 
account of recommendations by the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of 
England (FCA 2016b). But the FCA is not prescriptive about how banks and building 
societies should handle maximum amounts lent, or the stress tests on customer 
finances in the face of higher interest rates; practice varies widely. Second, a norm of 
behaviour appears necessary for mortgage advice. The academic literature on mort-
gage lending has concentrated on the literacy of those seeking mortgage advice 
(Cox et al. 2015, Disney & Gathergood 2013). But such an approach places heavy 
responsibility on the shoulders of the borrower, and not enough on advisors, who 
possess more knowledge. A trustworthy advisor needs to take the time to help clients 
understand the potential outcomes of different mortgage profiles. This reveals a need 
for ‘intelligent information provision’ (O’Neill 2006) on the part of advisors,  something 
which needs to become part of the new norm of behviour. 
It is important that these new standards are widely adopted and become the norm. 
In those circumstances it will become unattractive for providers to undercut these 
standards, so that the standard becomes self-reinforcing. That will prevent the emer-
gence of the kind of unaffordable lending which occurred before the crisis. Ideally, 
that will become the case without disciplinary action by the FCA being necessary. 
Fund managers 
The traditional economic approach of using financial incentives to encourage 
 trustworthy outcomes was also inadequate in the case of fund managers. That was 
justified by academic work on the principal-agent problem, on the grounds that per-
formance bonuses align the interests of managers and shareholders. But the interests 
of fund managers clearly encourage these actors to seek short-term benefit at the 
expense of the long-term interests of their clients (Stracca 2006), which happens as a 
result of tying bonuses to performance (Shiller 2013). Failure emerged in two  particular 
ways, both to do with moral hazard. 
First, financial products make it possible for a manager to create the appearance 
of superior performance over long periods of time. It is possible for a manager to use 
derivatives to increase investors’ normal rewards, and his or her own reward, at the 
same time as creating tail risks for the investor; this can be achieved by purchasing a 
derivative which regularly pays out a fee, in exchange for the occasional right to seize 
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the entire asset (Noe & Young 2014). Compensation schemes with bonuses usually 
have the feature that in the periods when the client makes a good return, the manager 
obtains a bonus. However, when the asset is seized by the person who issued the deriva-
tive, the investor loses everything, but the fund manager merely fails to get his or her 
bonus. It obviously benefits a fund manager to seek out products which create a good 
return in this manner, even if  doing so creates tail risks. Performance contracts can 
guard against such untrustworthy behaviour only if  they enforce very large losses on 
managers in bad times—for example, bankruptcy or imprisonment—but managers 
do not often accept that possibility. Since such a set-up will normally yield good 
returns for the investor, it will take many years before investors can determine with 
any degree of confidence whether a fund manager who is generating good returns is 
actually trustworthy, or is instead acting in a dishonest way by creating tail risks. In 
the lead-up to the sub-prime crisis in the US, it appears that many fund managers 
were effectively concealing fat tails in the returns on assets (Shiller 2013). Sometimes 
this was due to intentional deception, designed to take advantage of clients, as in the 
Abacus case (O’Brien 2012).
Second, the complexity of new products and the size of modern financial 
 institutions make it difficult and costly for investors to monitor risky investments 
directly. A self-interested and selfish manager cannot be made to do this by means of 
bonuses in his or her compensation scheme. This is also because such bonus schemes 
do not contain sufficiently large penalties in the event of a catastrophe. It may be true 
that, if  managers undertake monitoring on behalf  of their clients, they will reduce the 
probability of such a catastrophe. But managers will face nothing worse than a no- 
bonus outcome if  a catastrophe occurs. And there is only a very low probability of 
this happening, even if  they do not carry out the necessary monitoring. As a result, 
they must be paid a very high bonus if  they are to find it worthwhile to incur the cost 
of risk monitoring, merely in order to slightly reduce the (small) probability of earn-
ing no bonus. Instead, they will find it more attractive to act dishonestly and merely 
pretend to monitor, knowing that things will go well most of the time. It is clear that 
performance contracts induce managers to undertake monitoring only if  they enforce 
very large losses on managers in bad times. Since the probability of catastrophe is low, 
it will take many years before investors discover that such monitoring is not in fact 
happening. 
It is clear that the pursuit of reputation will not—of itself—be sufficient to prevent 
such outcomes, since the time scales are long. Research is needed on the way in which 
concern for the well-being of customers might be brought to bear in influencing the 
choice of assets, and about how performance of assets is monitored. A norm of 
behaviour is needed in which fund managers reveal more, in detail, about how risky 
assets are chosen for clients and about how these risky assets are monitored. 
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Behavioural norms in which there is mere disclosure of information by advisors will 
not be sufficient to meet this need (O’Neill 2006). Mere disclosure of information 
is not ‘communication’; communication fails if  the audience cannot understand and 
assess what is communicated and assess its credibility. Something more than this is 
needed. 
Insurers
The traditional economic approach of contracts and monitoring to secure trust-
worthiness was, once again, inadequate in the case of the provision of insurance. The 
appropriate level of insurance for customers depends on their reserves and ability to 
bear adverse events, and on their appetite for risk. It is necessary to develop norms of 
behaviour around sales of insurance to secure robust trustworthiness in this sale, 
across a wide range of circumstances.
The case of Payments Protection Insurance (PPI), or credit protection insurance, 
is useful to illustrate what went wrong and why norms are needed. PPI is a product 
that enables consumers to ensure the repayment of credit if  the borrower experiences 
circumstances that prevent them from earning income to service the debt (Georgosouli 
2014, McConnell & Blacker 2012). As we now know, in the UK, PPI was widely mis-
sold by banks and other credit providers as an add-on to a loan or overdraft product. 
The sale of such policies was typically encouraged by commissions; some companies 
developed sales scripts which suggested sales people say only that the loan was ‘pro-
tected’ (de Meza et al. 2010). Such scripts neither mentioned the nature nor the cost 
of the insurance, so many consumers did not know that they had purchased PPI.
The most obvious problem with PPI misselling was this fraudulent misdescription 
of products. However, while avoiding fraudulent behaviour is necessary, it is not suffi-
cient. The way PPI was sold encouraged sellers to sell insurance to customers  regardless 
of their need or of their risk appetite, in a situation in which customers were unaware of 
the costs and benefits of the insurance. 
A trustworthy insurer needs to take the time to help the client to understand the 
potential outcomes of different insurance policies and go through which one best 
suits the client’s ability to bear the cost of adverse events and assesses carefully their 
appetite for risk. As in the previous cases, there is also a question of how information 
should be communicated to customers. It is important to make sure that norms of 
behaviour developed in this context are geared towards enabling the intelligent 
non-specialist customer to use his or her own judgement about whether to take out 
insurance. As things stand, the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
and the UK Money Advice Service aim to improve customer financial literacy, and 
the CFPB allocates the responsibility for this improvement to firms (McConnell & 
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Blacker 2012). However, it is also important to increase literacy without placing an 
unreasonable burden on the customer. Financial institutions have an obligation to 
ensure the kind of intelligent information provision described earlier. In this area, 
norms of communication make a difference to sustaining trustworthiness. It is clear 
that certain such norms have already begun to change; the way that those who sold 
PPI acted is no longer widely acceptable. 
Traders 
What went wrong amongst traders, both before and after the financial crisis, was not 
to do with a lack of concern for the well-being of clients, but was instead a result of 
fraud. 
Traders act purely in their own self-interest and are not concerned with the  interests 
of others. In particular, propriety traders trade on their own account in order to gain 
instantaneous rewards from short-run price movements. In doing this they engage in 
risk arbitrage: they profit from price discrepancies across markets. Their self- interested 
behaviour plays a useful role in markets where their actions ensure that the prices in 
markets reflect value (Shiller 2013).
Unlike the other front-line employees that we have analysed, norms that show 
concern for others are inappropriate for traders. Rather, traders have a narrowly 
defined set of obligations with which they are expected to comply. The task for traders 
is to avoid fraud. 
The LIBOR and foreign exchange market scandals resulted from fraudulent 
behaviour. The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a benchmark short-term 
interest rate that is calculated from submissions by a number of leading banks, which 
estimate their costs of borrowing on the inter-bank market. Banks misreported what 
it cost them to borrow, in an ongoing manner. Many banks held large financial 
 positions that were indexed to LIBOR, so that the numbers submitted directly 
impacted the profits of traders. Although submitters were supposed to be separated 
from traders by Chinese walls, it was common practice for traders and submitters to 
collude over the rate report (McConnell 2013).5 In itself, the fact that traders were able 
to record their dealings shows that the practice had become institutionalised. It seems 
possible that management knew about and even condoned false reporting (Nelson 
2016). 
5 The management of banks also faced a conflict of interests. First, a lower submission implied a greater 
credit-worthiness, so a bank had incentives to report too low a rate in order to protect its reputation. 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission uncovered a management directive to ‘keep LIBOR 
submissions lower to protect Barclays’ reputation’ (McConnell 2013).
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Correcting this corrupt behaviour will not require the behaviour of traders to be 
underpinned by a concern for the well-being of others. A successful process of finan-
cial reform will still leave traders as self-interested actors playing a valuable role in 
markets. This has significant implications for the reform of the governance of  financial 
firms. Nevertheless, norms were important in what happened; it became a common 
practice to submit misleading reports, behaviour which was supported by cooperation 
amongst the traders.
Implications for research 
We already know from experimental research that some environments permit people 
to be dishonest. And there is evidence that a banking frame can lead to more dis-
honest behaviour by bank employees. For example, a 2014 study undertook a 
behavioural experiment with bank employees and employees in other industries. The 
study found that the employees of a large international bank on average behaved hon-
estly in a control condition. However, when their professional identity as a bank 
employee was rendered salient in the experiment, a significant proportion of them 
acted dishonestly (Cohn et al. 2014). But there is, as yet, little work on the reverse 
question: how is it possible to encourage people to be honest? 
Our discussion above has suggested that two things are necessary, in all of  mortgage 
provision, fund management, and the provision of insurance. The first is that enough 
actors come to see the importance of acting in a way which has regard to the needs of 
customers. Second, enough other actors need to follow the first group, to ensure that 
such behaviour becomes a norm. What is now needed is a detailed study of how this 
can be made to happen. It will be important to understand the way in which there is 
something about the culture of financial institutions, including but not confined to the 
reward structure, that leads people to behave badly, and to propose and test how 
 cultural change might be used to encourage individuals to behave in a more moral 
manner. Given that we acknowledge that not all individuals will be other-regarding, 
research about the development of norms in populations that consist of both 
 other-regarding and selfish types is required. Some experimental evidence exists about 
the development of cooperative norms amongst selfish individuals in the lab (Fehr & 
Gintis 2017), but it will be important to apply this to the financial sector in future 
research.
We have also argued that a norm of intelligent information provision is central to 
good outcomes in all of these activities. Research is needed into what that norm 
should be. However, best practice for information provision is not a simple matter 
because the way that information is presented may influence product choice. People 
use heuristics in decision making, which may lead to ‘biases’, or systematic errors in 
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judging the probability of outcomes or in predicting how one will feel about outcomes 
if  they occur (Baron 2014). Benartzi and Thaler (2007) discuss how this can affect 
individual saving for retirement and Kahneman and Riepe (1998) apply this to 
 financial advice. Work is needed on how this affects the way that information should 
be provided to purchasers and consumers of financial products.
In contrast, we have argued that the activity of traders can be, and is, selfish. But 
there too there is need for a norm of information provision—information needs to be 
truthfully provided. In our discussion of other roles within the bank, we argued that 
what is needed is other-regarding rather than selfish motivations in order to get better 
outcomes. Here what is required is the prevention of illegal outcomes. Preventing 
fraud is about enforcing the law; other-regarding motivations are not the relevant 
ones. Nevertheless, one might be able to use the apparatus of norms to tell a story 
which is similar to that told in relation to other roles, one in which a small group of 
people who are motivated to obey the law can galvanise a norm of good behaviour. 
GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL FIRMS: 
THE RESEARCH WHICH IS NEEDED
The classic analysis of corporate governance—and of how the board of a company 
should behave—is the principal-agent model (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997). Underpinning this model is the idea that shareholders are those who 
bear the risk concerning whether a firm does well or badly, and that shareholders 
should be rewarded for bearing this risk. Analysis of this model has been used to show 
that shareholder value can be maximised through an appropriate use of financial 
incentives for the board and for the firm’s employees (Ross 1973). This same analysis 
has been used to suggest that a firm which seeks to maximise shareholder value 
through the use of financial incentives will build a reputation for acting in a trust-
worthy manner. Doing so, it is argued, will enable the firm to deliver services to clients 
in a way which would not be possible if  these clients did not trust it. 
But we have shown above that, in the provision of  mortgages, fund management 
services and insurance, the use of  financial incentives is—on its own—unlikely to 
bring about a trustworthy outcome. The difficulty which we have identified is that 
employees may act in a way which increases their short-run return, at the expense of 
their customers and clients. The task facing a board of  a company and its manage-
ment is to take into account what modes of  behaviour—what norms—are necessary 
for those who work for the firm to be strongly trustworthy in relation to the firm’s 
clients, and to lead the firm in a way designed to help to bring about this 
behaviour. 
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This has three implications for the behaviour of the board of a firm, and for its 
management. 
First, this trustworthy behaviour will only become the norm if it is underpinned by 
a board of the company which encourages, and leads, such behaviour. This will be the 
case if the board of directors sees itself as having as an obligation to ensure the longer 
term prosperity of the firm. (Blair & Stout 1999, Clark 1986). It is well known that the 
type of shareholder a firm has influences the type of action that the board and senior 
managers take (Ravasi & Zattoni 2006, Shleifer & Vishny 1986, Zattoni 2011, Zeitoun 
& Pamini 2015). A firm may have ‘transactional shareholders’, concerned only about 
short-term returns (Strine 2017). But a firm may have shareholders who are ‘relational 
owners’, ones who are concerned about the long-term relationships with customers and 
clients that its employees need to form, in the long-term interests of the firm. Boards of 
trustworthy companies will need to find ways of defending themselves against the 
 pressure exerted by transactional shareholders, so as to lead and encourage the behaviour 
of trustworthy employees. Efforts are being made to do this. (See, for example, Barclays 
Bank 2018.) Research is needed to see how successful these efforts are. 
Second, the norms of behaviour in client-facing parts of a financial firm need to 
be shielded from the norms of behaviour amongst traders, since they differ from the 
norms of behaviour for traders. The relationship between traders and those from 
whom they buy these products need not be one of strong trustworthiness. Instead, it 
is merely necessary that such traders act so as to avoid fraud. Providing that fraud is 
avoided, such traders may act in a purely self-regarding manner. 
Yet, in many universal banks, traders and client-facing staff  work alongside each 
other. The interactions between traders and these other employees are critical, since 
self-regarding motivations can spread throughout a firm if  not carefully contained, 
undermining the appropriate norms of behaviour. We have argued that if, in the 
 client-facing part of a firm, there are enough actors who have regard for the interests 
of others, or who follow standards, then this will cause other actors to follow their 
behaviour, leading to a self-supporting outcome of trustworthy behaviour. But if  the 
self-regarding norms of traders spread, then that jeopardises the underpinning of 
strongly trustworthy behaviour, undermining the non-self-regarding obligations 
of enough actors, leading to a norm of untrustworthy behaviour. 
This may well encourage mortgage providers, fund managers, and insurers to 
act in ways that disadvantage their customers. We have argued that norms of behaviour 
are established in part by the copying of others; it may be that the kinds of 
behaviour carried out by traders come to be copied by others, leading to untrust-
worthy behaviour. This shows just how difficult it will be for management to ensure 
adequate norms of behaviour in a firm with many different purposes. There is a 
 significant research question in determining how this might be prevented.
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This need for differing norms in different parts of financial firms creates an issue 
for those who have argued in favour of ethical leadership in firms (Nelson 2016). It 
has been argued that the board and senior managers need to act as ethical leaders in 
firms, in order to establish appropriate norms across a firm. It has been found that 
integrity and ethical stewardship are important determinants of trust in leaders, both 
proximal supervisors and distal top managers (Fulmer & Gelfand 2012). Ethical 
 stewardship has been defined as the honouring of duties owed to employees, stake-
holders, and society in the pursuit of long-term wealth creation (Caldwell et al. 
2008)—the pursuit of trustworthiness which we have been discussing in this paper will 
be part of that process. It is argued that trust in leaders is increased when leaders and 
subordinates share the same values (Fulmer & Gelfand 2012). But, as we have been 
arguing, the values of traders will necessarily differ from those in other parts of the 
firm, so leaders cannot share the values of all employees. It would be a problem if  the 
client-facing parts of the firm perceive the values of the leadership as in alignment 
with those of the traders. In particular, this may be a problem for independent  directors 
of a firm, if  they represent the interests of transactional shareholders who have 
short-lasting tenure or remuneration geared to short-term results (Kang & Kroll 
2013). The board and the management of a firm need to endorse the norms that are 
appropriate for the areas in which the parts of the firm operate. 
However, if  these different parts of a firm need to have different kinds of norms, 
then this situation will be demanding for management to bring about. Understanding 
how this might be brought about requires a much more detailed anthropology of 
banking than is currently available. This will require detailed observational study 
of the units involved. One important way to carry out this research will involve analysing 
the behaviour of banks that functioned well in the run-up to and after the global 
financial crisis, and comparing that with the behaviour of banks that did not. This 
approach will enable us to determine the extent to which a different form of corporate 
governance enabled better outcomes, and the role which management structure played 
in bringing about these good outcomes. This sort of corporate anthropology is also an 
important basis for research using the abstract methods of behavioural and evolution-
ary economics. These disciplines use models that abstract the important features of 
interactions. But knowing about the interactions in more detail is a prelude to being 
able to provide a relevant model. This can open up promising avenues of research: for 
instance, it seems likely that research into the role of leadership could benefit from 
study of behaviour in asymmetrical games, where the players move diachronically and 
have different pay-offs.
Third, in universal banks, and other financial institutions that carry out a range of 
services, it may be that fund managers, insurers, and the providers of insurance need 
to protect their clients from the behaviour of traders within the firm. 
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One example reveals the difficulties involved. In the well-known Abacus case, 
assets which appeared likely to fall in price were packaged together by analysts acting 
for Goldman Sachs. Traders shorted the resulting bundle of securities products, 
intending to make money when the price fell (O’Brien 2012). At the same time, the 
client-facing part of Goldman Sachs, in which individuals provided fund manage-
ment services to clients, sold these assets to their clients. The clients relied on the 
superior knowledge and reputation of Goldman Sachs to select assets for them, but 
the fund managers in Goldman Sachs did not protect their clients from the risks 
 associated with these assets. Trustworthy behaviour by the client-facing part of the 
organisation would have required that this part of the firm not sell such products to 
its clients, which had been created in another part of the firm. 
This activity was untrustworthy not because fund managers should have used their 
superior knowledge, on which their reputation depended, to ensure that they did not 
sell such products to clients. This is because risky products of this kind are regularly 
created in markets and fund managers inevitably make mistakes in failing to identify 
them when selecting assets for their clients to buy. We do not make such a competence- 
based argument. 
Instead, we say that trustworthy behaviour by the client-facing part of the 
 organisation would have required that this part of the firm not to sell such products to 
its clients, because they had been created by employees working for Goldman Sachs. In 
this article we have argued that trustworthy fund-management behaviour needs to be 
built on a concern for the well-being of customers. We now argue, additionally, that if  
a firm employing fund managers—in this case Goldman Sachs—is to show concern for 
the well-being of customers, then that will require that fund managers be able to  protect 
customers from deleterious actions of those working for other parts of the firm.
One response to this problem is the one offered by Goldman Sachs in the Abacus 
case—the Chinese wall defence. This defence argued that fund managers were unaware 
that the relevant assets were likely to fall in price, because of the existence of a Chinese 
wall within the firm. Fund managers had not themselves constructed the bad assets 
which were being sold to clients—it was said—and the existence of a Chinese wall 
meant that the fund managers were unaware that the assets were ones which were 
likely to fall in price.
However, the CEO and the board have oversight of both the fund-management 
and the trading divisions. There appears to be a conflict between overseeing fund 
managers who are required to act in a trustworthy way towards clients and overseeing 
the activity of traders who create bad products that may be sold to clients by fund 
managers. This conflict can be said to arise because of an analogy with a person. An 
individual person could not be said to be trustworthy in relation to a particular con-
tract if  that person—at the same time as signing the contract—deliberately undertook 
action which would damage outcomes for the recipient of that contract.
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This kind of problem creates a demanding challenge for the management of a 
firm, and for the board. It becomes the task of management, and the board, to iden-
tify actions of any one part of a firm that are likely to damage the well-being of clients 
of any other part of the firm, and to advise the client-facing parts of the firm—here 
the fund managers—to behave in ways which insulate their clients from that first set 
of actions. This will require a reporting structure and decision-making structure which 
make this possible. It will be hard for senior management to do this and for the board 
to ensure that this is done, but it will be essential. This creates a further task for the 
ethical leadership of a firm. 
How this can be brought about will require a continuation and extension of the 
work on ethics management which has already begun (de Bruin 2014, 2015). One 
response, which has been adopted by Barclays and by banks in the Netherlands, is to 
require that executives attend ethics education courses (de Bruin 2014, 2015). However, 
we caution against this approach, at least in the absence of evidence showing that it 
will be successful. We note that evidence from other sectors, such as public health, 
shows that information and training alone are not enough to change behaviour 
(Marteau 2018, Webb & Sheeran 2006). We also know that familiarity with moral 
theories does not improve behaviour: research has shown that professors specialising 
in ethics do not behave more ethically than other professors (Schwitzgebel & Rust 
2014). Instead, we think a more promising route is to turn to behavioural science and 
to draw on evidence about the ways in which we can change behaviour, sometimes 
called the ‘behavioural insights’ approach (Dolan et al. 2012). It is important to move 
towards ‘behavioural management’ and ‘behavioural organisational science’.
CONCLUSION
We have examined what patterns of behaviour or norms might exist in a financial 
institution that is acting in a strongly trustworthy manner. 
We have argued that the kinds of norms that are required for trustworthiness  differ 
across the different kinds of activities that take place within a financial sector firm. We 
have identified a number of actors and have asked what is necessary for their activity 
to be trustworthy: we have considered shareholders, the board, mortgage lenders, 
fund managers, insurers, and traders. In doing this we have described how the patterns 
of behaviour, or norms, that are trustworthy differ in each of these activities. 
We have shown how—in all of the activities in financial firms that we have 
 considered, other than trading—a concern for the well-being of others is necessary in 
order to sustain patterns of behaviour that are trustworthy. We have argued that such 
activities are likely to be provided in an untrustworthy manner if  the choices made by 
those working within the firms are framed in a manner that is entirely self-regarding. 
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We have also argued that, if  those working in these activities frame their activity in 
terms of concern for the well-being of clients, then that might lead to the provision of 
the service in a more trustworthy manner. However, in addition—and this is the 
point of focusing on norms—the behaviour of those who show concern for the well- 
being of clients may well have effects on the self-regarding actors as well, even if  those 
self-regarding actors do not change the way they frame the activity. If  left to them-
selves, the motivations of these self-regarding actors may lead them to act in an 
untrustworthy way. Nevertheless, it may be that, because of the influence of those who 
show concern for the well-being of clients, trustworthy behaviour becomes the norm. 
We have described the kinds of research which are necessary to give greater support 
to these claims. 
We have argued that trustworthy trading activity is different. Trading does not 
need to be—and cannot be—supported by actors whose motivations relate to the 
well-being of clients. Trading is a self-interested activity; it is not concerned with 
achieving ‘fair’ outcomes. Nevertheless, standards are important; we have argued that 
fraudulent behaviour needs to be avoided and trading activity can only be trustworthy 
if  this happens. 
Our work suggests that there is a deep problem for the governance of financial 
firms. The board of such a firm has to confront the fact that trading is a self-interested 
activity, whereas the norms of behaviour in other parts of a financial firm need to be 
underpinned by at least some individuals showing concern for the well-being of  clients. 
There is a need to prevent the self-interested motivations of traders from infecting the 
motivations of those in other parts of the institution. Even if  this does not happen, 
there is a need to protect the customers in the client-facing part of an institution from 
those activities of traders that might damage their well-being. Research is necessary 
into how these two necessary outcomes could be achieved. 
One implication of this is that a clear firm structure and set of trust relations is a 
prerequisite for achieving trustworthiness of financial institutions. This has implica-
tions for the proposed ring fencing of banks. This ring fencing has been set up to 
separate banks’ retail operations from their riskier investment banking activities 
(Independent Commission on Banking 2011). But ring fencing should also separate 
the trading departments, in which the employees are necessarily profit-seeking and 
self-interested, from the other financial activities that we have analysed. The more 
complex and ambiguous the structure of a firm, the harder this ring fencing will be to 
achieve. It will also be all the more important. There is a clear challenge to those 
working on ethics management in finance, and ethical leadership, to determine how 
this might be achieved. 
 Restoring trustworthiness in the financial system 151
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and are glad to 
acknowledge financial support from the British Academy’s Research Project on the 
Future of the Corporation.
REFERENCES
Anderson, E. (2000), ‘Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29: 170–200. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00170.x
Baier, A. (1986), ‘Trust and Antitrust’, Ethics, 96(2): 231–60. https://doi.org/10.1086/292745
Barclays Bank (2013), ‘Salz Review: An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices’.   
https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SalzReview04032013.pdf [accessed 9August 
2018].
Barclays Bank (2018), ‘Performance Measures’.   
https://www.home.barclays/about-barclays/performance-measures.html [accessed 5 November 2018].
Baron, J. (2014), ‘Heuristics and Biases’, in E. Zamir & D. Teichman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Behavioural Economics and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press), 3–27.
Benartzi, S. & Thaler, R. (2007), ‘Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behaviour’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 21(3): 81–104. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.3.81
Binmore, K. (2006), ‘Why Do People Cooperate?’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 5(1): 81–96. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X06060620
Blair, M. M. & Stout, L. A. (1999), ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, Virginia Law Review, 
85, 247–328. https://doi.org/10.2307/1073662
Caldwell, C., Hayes, L. A., Bernal, P. & Karri, R. (2008), ‘Ethical Stewardship—Implications for 
Leadership and Trust’, Journal of Business Ethics, 78(1–2), 153–64.   
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9320-1
Clark, R. C. (1986), Corporate Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer).
Cohn, A., Fehr, E. & Marechal, A. (2014), ‘Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry’, 
Nature, 516: 86–9. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13977
Cox, R., Brounen, D. & Neuteboom, P. (2015), ‘Financial Literacy, Risk Aversion and Choice of 
Mortgage Type by Households’, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 50(1): 74–112. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9453-9
de Bruin, B. (2014), ‘Ethics Management in Banking and Finance’, in N. Morris & D. Vines (eds) Capital 
Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 255–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712220.003.0012
de Bruin, B. (2015), Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139237093
Disney, R. & Gathergood, J. (2013), ‘Financial Literacy and Consumer Credit Portfolios’, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 37: 2246–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.013
De Meza, D., Irlenbusch, B. & Reyniers, D. (2010), ‘Disclosure, Trust and Persuasion in Insurance 
Markets’, discussion paper 5060, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Bonn. 
Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D., Metcalfe, R. & Vlaev, I. (2012), ‘Influencing Behaviour: 
The Mindspace Way’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(1): 264–77.   
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.009
Edelman (2018), Edelman Trust Barometer.   
http://cms.edelman.com/sites/default/files/2018-01/2018_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_
Report_Jan.PDF [accessed 3 February 2018].
152 Aisling Crean, Natalie Gold, David Vines and Annie Williamson 
Fehr, E. & Gintis, H. (2007), ‘Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical 
Foundations’, Annual Review of Sociology, 33: 43–64.   
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131812
FSA (2010), ‘Mortgage Market Review: Responsible Lending’, Financial Services Authority, July.  
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/fsa-cp10-16.pdf [accessed 18 September 2018].
FSA (2016a), ‘Interest Rate Stress Test’, Financial Services Authority.   
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/interest-rate-stress-test
FSA (2016b), ‘Embedding the Mortgage Market Review: Responsible Lending Review’, Financial 
Services Authority.   
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/thematic-reviews/tr16-04.pdf [accessed 1 November 2018].
FSA (2018), ‘Transforming Culture in Financial Services’, discussion paper 2, March,  Financial Conduct 
Authority. https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp18-02.pdf [accessed 9 August 2018].
Fulmer, C. A. & Gelfand, M. J. (2012), ‘At What Level (and in Whom) We Trust: Trust Across Multiple 
Organizational Levels’, Journal of Management, 38: 1167–230.   
https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206312439327
G30 (2015), ’Banking Conduct and Culture’.   
http://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_BankingConductandCulture.pdf [accessed 
9August 2018].
Georgosouli, A. (2014), ‘Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) Misselling: Some Lessons from the UK’, 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 21: 261–88.
Gold, N. (2014), ‘Trustworthiness and Motivations’, in N. Morris & D. Vines (eds.), Capital Failure: 
Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 129–53.   
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712220.003.0006
Hollis, M. (1998), Trust Within Reason (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).   
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612244
Holton, R. (1994), ‘Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72(1): 
63–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409412345881
House of Lords, House of Commons (2013), ‘Changing Banking for Good: Report of the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards’.   
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf 
Independent Commission on Banking (2011), Final Recommendations.   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131003105424/https:/hmt-sanctions.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
icb%20final%20report/icb%2520final%2520report%5B1%5D.pdf
Ipsos MORI (2017), Ipsos-MORI Veracity Index.   
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2017-11/trust-in-professions-veracity- 
index-2017-slides.pdf [accessed 25 January 2018].
Jaffer, S. Morris, N. & Vines, D. (2014), ‘Why Trustworthiness is Important’, in N. Morris & D. Vines, 
(eds) Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services (Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712220.003.0001
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–60.   
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Kahneman, D. & Riepe, M. W. (1998), ‘Aspects of Investor Psychology’, Journal of Portfolio Management, 
24(4): 52–65. https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.1998.409643
Kang, E. & Kroll, M. (2013), ‘Deciding Who Will Rule: Examining the Influence of Outside Noncore 
Directors on Executive Entrenchment’, Organization Science, 25: 1662–83.   
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2013.0874
Mailath, G. J. & Samuelson, L. (2006), Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-run Relationships (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
 Restoring trustworthiness in the financial system 153
Marteau, T. M. (2018), ‘Changing Minds About Changing Behaviour’, The Lancet, 391(10116): 116–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)33324-X
McConnell, P. (2013), ‘Systemic Operational Risk: The LIBOR Manipulation Scandal’, The Journal of 
Operational Risk, 8(3): 59–99. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2013.127
McConnell, P. & Blacker, K. (2012), ‘Systemic Operational Risk: The UK Payment Protection Insurance 
Scandal’, The Journal ofOoperational Risk, 7(1): 79–139.   
https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2012.104
Morris, N. & Vines, D. (eds) (2014), Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712220.001.0001
Nelson, J. S. (2016), ‘The Normalization of Corruption’, Journal of Management Inquiry, 25: 1–7.
Noe, T. & Young, H. P. (2014), ‘The Limits to Compensation in the Financial Sector’, in N. Morris & 
D. Vines (eds) Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Sinancial services (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712220.003.0003
O’Brien, J. (2012), ‘The Façade of Enforcement: Goldman Sachs, Negotiated Prosecution, and the 
Politics of Blame’, in S. Will, S. Handelman & D. Brotherton (eds) How They Got Away with it: 
White Collar Criminals and the Financial Meltdown (New York, Columbia University Press), 
178–202.
O’Neill, O. (2002), A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures 2002 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press).
O’Neill, O. (2006), ‘Transparency and the Ethics of Communication’, in Transparency: The Key to Better 
Governance? C. Hood & D. Heald (eds) (Oxford, Oxford University Press), 75–90.   
https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0005
O’Neill, O. (2016), ‘What is Banking For?’, remarks by Baroness Onora O’Neill, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, October.   
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/ONeill-Culture- 
Workshop-Remarks-10202016.pdf [accessed 9 August 2018].
Ravasi, D. & Zattoni, A. (2006), ‘Exploring the Political Side of Board Involvement in Strategy: A Study 
of Mixed-ownership Institutions’, Journal of Management Studies, 43: 1671–702.   
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00659.x
Ross., S. (1973), ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’, American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 63(2): 134–9. 
Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry 
(2018). https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx
Schwitzgebel, E. & Rust, J. (2014), ‘The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships Among Self-
reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior’, Philosophical 
Psychology, 27: 293–327. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.727135
Shiller, R. J. (2013), Finance and the Good Society (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press). https://doi.
org/10.1515/9781400846177
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1997), ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Finance, 52: 737–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1986), ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 94: 461–88. https://doi.org/10.1086/261385
Stracca, L. (2006), ‘Delegated Portfolio Management: A Survey of the Theoretical Literature’, Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 20: 823–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2006.00271.x
Strine, L. E. (2017), ‘Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from my Hometown’, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 33(2): 176–87. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grx027
Susskind, D. (2014), ‘Towards an Economic Theory of Moral Contagion’, MPhil thesis, University of 
Oxford. 
154 Aisling Crean, Natalie Gold, David Vines and Annie Williamson 
Webb, T. L. & Sheeran, P. (2006), ‘Does Changing Behavioral Intentions Engender Behavior Change? A 
Meta-analysis of the Experimental Evidence’, Psychological Bulletin, 132(2): 249–68.   
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.249
Williamson, O. E. (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’, The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 36(1, Part 2): 453–86. https://doi.org/10.1086/467284
Young, H. P. (2015), ‘The Evolution of Social Norms’, Annual Review of Economics, 7: 359–87.  
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115322
Zattoni, A. (2011), ‘Who Should Control a Corporation? Toward a Contingency Stakeholder Model for 
Allocating Ownership Rights’, Journal of Business Ethics, 103: 255–74.   
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0864-3
Zeitoun, H. & Pamini, P. (2015), ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and Top Executives’ Prosocial 
Preferences: The Role of Relational and External Blockholders’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 23: 489–503. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12111
Notes on the authors: 
Dr Aisling Crean is a philosopher currently working on corporate trustworthiness 
and teaches on the Master of Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government, 
University of Oxford. She has just completed two British Academy postdoctoral 
 projects on corporate trustworthiness at the Blavatnik School of Government and at 
the Institute for New Economic Thinking, Oxford Martin School, University of 
Oxford. Recently, she published ‘Do corporations have a duty to be trustworthy?’ in 
the Journal of the British Academy (2018 (this issue)), with Nikolas Kirby and Andrew 
Kirton. Her interests range from ethics to political philosophy to the history of 
 philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysics. She has also published on David Hume.
aisling.crean@bsg.ox.ac.uk
Dr Natalie Gold is a Senior Research Fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy at the 
University of Oxford, and a Principal Behavioural Insights Advisor at Public Health 
England. Her work covers many subjects, from philosophy to behavioural science, 
often in an interdisciplinary manner. From 2011 to 2017 she was Principal Investigator 
on the European Research Council Grant ‘Self-Control and the Person: An 
Interdisciplinary Account’. She has published on topics including framing, moral 
judgements and decisions, cooperation and coordination, trustworthiness and finance, 
behaviour change and nudge, and self-control.
natalie.gold@rocketmail.com
David Vines is Emeritus Professor of Economics and Emeritus Fellow of Balliol 
College, at Oxford University. He is the Director of the Ethics and Economics 
Programme at the Institute for New Economic Thinking in the Oxford Martin School, 
and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London. His 
research is on financial reform, international macroeconomics, and global economic 
 Restoring trustworthiness in the financial system 155
governance. From 2018 to 2012 he was the Research Director of PEGGED, a 
European Union Framework Seven Research Programme, which examined European 
Dimensions of Global Economic Governance. His most recent book, written jointly 
with Peter Temin, is Keynes: Useful Economics for the World Economy (MIT Press, 
2014).
david.vines@economics.ox.ac.uk
Annie Williamson is a postgraduate in the Department of Economics at the University 
of Oxford, and a research economist at Partners in Health Mexico. Her work focusses 
on the role of motivation in labour markets, particularly in the National Health 
Service, and the relationship between health care and economic outcomes. She has 
published on decision making in the context of Brexit trade negotiations, and 
 presented on motivating health service provision and upholding the right to health 
care in Mexico. 
anne.williamson@economics.ox.ac.uk
To cite the article: Aisling Crean, Natalie Gold, David Vines and Annie Williamson 
(2018), ‘Restoring trustworthiness in the financial system: Norms, behaviour, and 
governance’, Journal of the British Academy, 6(s1): 131–155.
DOI https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/006s1.131
This article is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 Unported License.
Journal of the British Academy (ISSN 2052–7217) is published by
The British Academy—the national academy for the humanities and social sciences.
10–11 Carlton House Terrace, London, SW1Y 5AH
www.britishacademy.ac.uk

